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Originally, the DG and CCI were separate. Just like the EU Commissioners and DG Comp. They ended the Bhikaji Cama place separation and the power to appoint went to the CCI from the Central Government. The structural absorption of the DG created the first problem. It was solving for a lack of competition law knowledge and a loss of institution memory with the DG staffed by rotating officers.
The original separation was meant to mimic the independent prosecutor model. There was a reason the CCI could not originally close matters and why 26(8) had to be interpreted creatively. It removed discretionary power from the CCI. The matters before it were in rem. The college of commissioners were speaking to the market.
The CCI secretary ran the administrative side and the DG office ran the investigative side. Constantly rotated out and the DG office ran out of depth, while the secretary became a rubber stamp. There were 7 members, the "right-sizing" made the chairman / chairwoman way too powerful on the administrative side while solving quorum and constant natural justice issues.
Then there was a dedicated appellate forum which was dismantled. Early on, the Supreme Court in Brahm Dutt noted that since the CCI acts as a judge and issues heavy penalties, it must feature judicial independence. This forced the government to create a separate appellate body, the COMPAT.
The government also responded with judicial members as well. Now the lack of a proper judicial member as mandated continues to haunt the CCI. The current "judicial member's" ties are known. The fact that no retired judge has walked into the CCI for nearly a decade speaks volumes. The judiciary doesnt see eye to eye on the government on this issue anymore.
Then in Mahindra & Mahindra v. CCI the Delhi High Court, which by all accounts is in decline did a u-turn. By legally labeling CCI an administrative body, the courts systematically lowered the constitutional bar for strict separation of powers. Combined with the erasure of the COMPAT all this reduced the quality of immediate, independent judicial checks on the CCI's consolidated powers.
Because the CCI dictates the opening of investigations, controls the DG, and now has total discretion to accept or reject settlements or issue global turnover penalties, it wields massive leverage. A company is often forced to settle with the "investigator" to avoid being crushed by the same entity acting as "judge." This permenantly casts a shadow on the CCI's settlement and commitment regime.
The completely myopic manner in which the CCI grew also was made worse when the CCI never passed enough interim measures. Being an appealable order, the CCI never strengthened its legal wing enough to sit and defend interim orders hard enough fearing the defense of pre-judgement. This was down to the administrative side weakness.
The institution has lost balance but blaming this on suo moto powers is something else. That was always within the original mandate of section 19. The problem was someone wanted to make the CCI controllable. Someone wanted the CCI being capable of turning around and fine 200 crores while asking to review the same markets, acceptable. Someone wanted the CCI to look away when needed from the various monopolies it by itself fostered.
Such structural issues that come with combining concentrated executive power and declining state capacity by serial underfunding allowed competition law to be converted from an independent body with a market protection mandate into a tool for consolidating autocratic control. Where have we seen this before?
Defendants in the US frequently challenged the structural legitimacy of SEC and FTC administrative law judges, arguing their protection from removal violates Article II of the US Constitution. So to avoid getting bogged down in years of collateral constitutional litigation, the FTC increasingly files its heavy-hitting antitrust and consumer protection cases directly in federal district courts.
The recent conservative-majority US Supreme Court drove this, focusing on reining in the "administrative state", with Big Tech aggressively capitalising on these new legal weapons. The U.S. Supreme Court’s 6-3 conservative majority has indeed carried out what legal scholars call a systemic effort to deconstruct the "administrative state".
By systematically stripping away agencies' independent powers, the US Supreme Court purportedly attempts to shift structural power from unelected regulators directly into the hands of federal judges and the president. This is pushed by unitary executive theory, a constitutional law concept advanced by the Federalist Society, asserting that the president of the United States holds absolute control over the executive branch.
In the United States, this has been the cover for authoritarianism – institutions are viewed as being under attack.
Coming to India, we have a parliamentary system, and we do not have a theory of a unitary executive; the executive draws its powers from the legislature. We have a deliberate dual executive. Yes, we hear rants that we wish we had a presidential system, but we don't. We have Modi pushing for massive centralisation and pretty much undoing the independence of regulators, including the RBI. We just had the Supreme Court rule on the lack of the CJI in the selection committee for the CEC.
Most critically, unlike the US, we do not have state governments with their own antitrust laws that sweep into regulatory space where the federal government withdraws. Instead, we have independent regulators. It is not a new concept. Institutions like the RBI and CAG have operated in this manner for decades. Does India have the judicial strength of the United States? Tribunalisation was an answer to another problem. In India, for the CCI, we had Brahm Dutt and SAIL – the Supreme Court looked into this.
Now, coming to a simple point – the questioning of tribunalisation – it is legitimate, but for one particular regulator to surrender has all the hallmarks of sabotage backed by a law ministry or SG opinion. There are several other regulators who have suo motu powers and adjudicatory powers. SEBI (Section 11 & 11C of the SEBI Act), RERA (Section 35 of the RERA Act), CCPA (Section 10 & 18 of the Consumer Protection Act), etc. So why does one particular regulator commit harakiri before parliament?
In my experience, it sometimes feels more like a business driven by billables than by its people. Job satisfaction can take a back seat, increments and bonuses often feel opaque and disappointing, and promotions can appear to favour certain individuals rather than being based solely on merit.
Only twist is that we have a batch size of 180 and they have a batch size of 120.
18 L (fixed) + 6-8 L (bill share) + 5 L (bonus)
Since CAM - fixed (18) and bonus (3) it became the paymaster.
Not very surprised seeing the growth of the firm
Anyway, that's about as much as I have managed to piece together. Hope it works as a fair primer. Expect nothing more from a fourth year.
I have noticed that several faculty members have recently O.P. Jindal Global University. Some have joined public universities while others have moved to Munjal University in Gurgaon or taken up opportunities abroad.
Does anyone know what the main reasons are for this apparent outflow of faculty?
after 2 decades or so TS and AP vamoosed from CAM.......is this the new transformation model playing out?
Assuming that they should end somewhere at 35 this time.
Freshers do get hired but only the ones who have trained themselves well to be useful to be a senior litigant. No hand holding and absolutely no excuses. Disputes is a ruthless practice, but if you got it, you are already a far better lawyer than almost any other transactional lawyer.
Train madly. Know your bare acts. Stay updated on latest judicial pronouncements. Practice talking in front of a mirror. Mostly this is it and then the rest is genuinely magic.
https://x.com/realmanubhaker/status/2083915996830810264