(In a two-part series, Ritwika Sharma and Faiza Rahman respond to my essay on Article 124C, arguing that the provision is entirely constitutional) — Among the many contentious issues that engaged the attention of the Supreme Court in the NJAC case was Article 124C which has been alleged to be violat...

(In the previous essay, I had argued that Article 124C should be struck down, because it violates the separation of powers and the independence of the judiciary, both of which are part of the basic structure. In this essay, Vishwajith Sadananda and Malavika Prasad respond to that claim, arguing that...

Over the last one week, we have debated the constitutionality of Article 124A of the 99th Amendment, which constitutes the National Judicial Appointments Commission. Let us now consider an equally important provision that the 99th Amendment seeks to insert into the Constitution – Article 124C. Artic...

(In this guest post, Ritwika Sharma examines one of the more contentious issues of the NJAC challenge – the “eminent persons” who will form part of the proposed judicial appointments commission) As part of the new Article 124A, which details the composition of the National Judicial Appointments Comm...

(Continuing our discussion about the constitutionality of the 99th Amendment and the National Judicial Appointments Commission, Suhrith Parthasarathy argues that a close reading of the Second Judges Case leads to the conclusion that judicial primacy in appointments is not part of the basic structure...

(In his last essay, Vishwajith Sadanada argued that The Second Judges case did not hold judicial primacy in appointments to be part of the basic structure; and even if it did, following Nagaraj’s Case, a constitutional amendment can be struck down for violating the basic structure only if, in some w...

(In a two-part essay, Vishwajith Sadananda responds to the previous essay on this blog, arguing that Article 124A and the National Judicial Appointments Commission are constitutional, and should be upheld.) — There is no doubt that the independence of the judiciary and appointment of judges is very ...

In the last essay , I argued that a plain reading of the Second Judges Case makes it clear that the collegium arose not merely out of the textual reading of Article 124 (“consultation” as “concurrence”), but as a necessary guarantor of the basic feature of judicial independence, via the requirement ...

(Today, a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court reserved judgment in the constitutional challenge to the 99th Amendment and the National Judicial Appointments Commission Act , bringing to an end protracted litigation lasting many months [“the NJAC case”]. The 99th Amendment and the NJAC Act seek t...

(In this guest post, Mansi Binjrajka and Avani Choksi examine a Bombay High Court decision on the “right to water” under Article 21, and its discontents.) — Last year, the Bombay High Court passed an order , which was much applauded for declaring the right to water (RTW) to be implicit in Article 21...

The SC Bench hearing the National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC) should simply strike it down on technical grounds and not venture into its merits this time. The collegium theory is headache-inducing! The theory that gave rise to the collegium system for appointment of judges to the higher ...

(With the NJAC hearings winding down, we will be covering the issues extensively on this blog. To kick things off, Vasujith Ram responds to Sarangan Rajeshkumar’s essay on the question of the revival of the collegium, should the Supreme Court strike down the 99th Amendment) — In a post published a c...

Today, a two-judge bench of the Supreme Court began to hear the constitutional challenge to Sections 499 and 500 of the IPC, which criminalise defamation. This is a hugely significant free speech case, for many reasons. Section 499 has been on the statute books since 1860, and this is the first time...

S0 far, we have argued that the Directive Principles of State Policy ought to play a role as structuring values, which give concrete meaning to the abstractly-worded fundamental rights in Part III. But in that case, is there any difference that now remains between fundamental rights and directive pr...

As discussed in the last essay, interpreting the DPSPs as framework values within which the nature and scope of Part III rights are determined, is perhaps the best way of understanding – and intellectually grounding – the Court’s approach that Mr. Seervai finds so unpalatable. In a series of cases, ...

In the previous post, we saw how in the 60s and 70s, the Court gradually chipped away at its earlier jurisprudence: beginning with making the Principles constitutionally relevant, and then erasing their subordinate status to the fundamental rights. The consequences of these two moves are crucial. Be...

In this post, we continue our examination of the place and role of the Directive Principles of State Policy within the constitutional scheme. Part I dealt with the conceptual foundations underlying the division between fundamental rights and directive principles, and Part II focused on the history a...

(We are continuing our coverage of the key issues in the NJAC litigation. In this guest post, Saranagan Rajeshkumar argues that were the Supreme Court to strike down the 99th Amendment, the Collegium would revive). — Over the past week, most individuals involved in this debate seem to be of the opin...

(In this second essay of a two-part series, Shreya Atrey argues that a textual reading of Article 15(1) would imply that inter-sectional claims must fall within its ambit. Article 15(1) stipulates that “the State shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste, se...

(Previously on this blog, we have discussed the meaning of the phrase “on grounds only of…” in Article 15(1) of the Constitution. In a two-part guest post series, Shreya Atrey discusses the possibility of a discrimination jurisprudence that is sensitive to the claims of intersectionality, notwithsta...